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Abstract:
This paper examines Amartya Sen’s notion of ‘commitment’ in light of Geoffrey Brennan’s
recent discussion thereof. Its aim is to elucidate one type of commitment which consists
in following social norms. To this end, I discuss Sen’s ‘apples’ example from his ‘Rational
fools’ essay (section 2). In section 3, I draw some implications of commitments in Sen’s
work for the concept of ‘agent relativity’. Section 4 discusses the distinctiveness of Sen’s
conception of human beings in their supposed ability to be able to bind themselves to
following social norms at the expense of their own beneﬁt.
1. Introduction
Amartya Sen’s notion of ‘commitment’ poses a challenge to understandings of
rationality which conceive choices to ‘reveal’ or otherwise straightforwardly ex-
press the preferences of the chooser (‘preferences’ being related to the well-being
of the person who has them). Sen has made several attempts to present, revise
and illustrate the notion of commitment, but the concept is still surrounded by
an air of mystery which is one reason it meets with both incomprehension and
opposition. The fault is partly Sen’s, for he sometimes presents the concept as if
it were more straightforward than it is; one manifestation of this is an example
he uses in his ‘Rational fools’ essay, in which ‘commitment’ was ﬁrst introduced,
which purports to exemplify the distinction between ‘commitment’ and ‘sympa-
thy’. The example concerns two boys who are each to choose one of two apples,
one larger than the other. In a recent volume dedicated to commitment and ra-
tionality (Peter and Schmid 2007), Geoffrey Brennan offers an examination of
Sen’s apples, to my knowledge, the ﬁrst sustained scrutiny which the example
has received. Brennan (2007, 118) notes the “risk of weighing down a striking
example with an excess of analysis”, yet analysis is the only way of ascertaining
whether the example does what Sen claims of it. I will burden it with yet more
analysis in what follows despite my fear that analysis will sully the beauty of
an example which, one might hold, is better left free of analysis. Brennan takes
issue with Sen’s view that the example illustrates the distinction between sym-
pathy and commitment. In offering an alternative interpretation of the example,
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‘exegetical’, in that I do not ‘take sides’ with or against Brennan or Sen; rather
I try to elucidate precisely what Sen means by commitment and how his view
is distinct from those of others, including Brennan. I do not tackle every aspect
of what Sen writes on commitment—something which the format of a journal
article does not permit; instead I focus on only one type of commitment which,
Sen holds, people are able to make, namely, the following of social norms. Sen’s
conception of what it means to follow self-imposed norms is quite different to
other conceptions of the phenomenon put forward by economists. The difference
bespeaks an entirely different Menschenbild. In limiting my focus to norm fol-
lowing behaviour, I believe I can reveal what is distinct about Sen’s conception
of human beings without becoming unduly bogged down in his terminology, over
which many a commentator has stumbled, of choosing ‘counterpreferentially’ or
of acting on goals which are not one’s own.
In section 2, I contrast Sen’s and Brennan’s interpretations of the apples
example, whereafter, in section 3, I explore an aspect of Sen’s work which Bren-
nan’s analysis suggests but leaves unexplored, namely, that there be a connec-
tion between committed behaviour and what Sen calls ‘agent relativity’. The
fourth section looks at people’s commitment to follow of social norms. Here, I
purport to expose the crux of the difference between Sen and Brennan which
revolves around the status of norms and the decision of the agent to follow or
break a norm once she has committed herself to adhering to the norm.
2. Apples, Sympathy and Commitment
First the example—“of two boys who ﬁnd two apples, one large and one small”—
and Sen’s remarks thereon:
“Boy A tells boy B, ‘You choose’. B immediately picks the larger ap-
ple. A is upset and permits himself the remark that this was grossly
unfair. ‘Why?’ asks B. ‘Which one would you have chosen, if you were
to choose rather than me?’ ‘The smaller one, of course’, A replies. B
is now triumphant: ‘Then what are you complaining about? That’s
the one you’ve got!’ B certainly wins this round of the argument,
but in fact A would have lost nothing from B’s choice had his own
hypothetical choice of the smaller apple been based on sympathy as
opposed to commitment. A’s anger indicates that this was probably
not the case.” (Sen 1982, 93)1
‘Sympathy’, Sen tells us, may be interpreted egoistically, for one has sympathy
with another person when one’s own welfare is affected by that of the other; one
takes pleasure in their pleasure and grieves at their pain. ‘Commitment’, by
1 References to ‘Rational fools’, originally published in 1977, are to the reprint in Sen (1982). Sen’s
apples example might have been inspired by a similar one offered by Ragnar Frisch which Sen
(2002, 177) quotes in (published) translation. Sen was aware of the unpublished translation of
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contrast, admits of no egoistic interpretation, for it can involve actions which
the actor “believes will yield a lower level of personal welfare to him than an
alternative” (Sen 1982, 92). Committed actions can, but need not, be one and
the same as the action from which one expects to maximize one’s own welfare,
but what characterises these cases as (non-egoistic) commitment rather than
(egoistic) sympathy is the following counterfactual: the actor would undertake
the committed act even if she expected it to detract from her personal welfare
vis-à-vis an alternative act which would maximize her expected personal wel-
fare. How is the apples example supposed to illustrate the distinction between
sympathy and commitment?
One problem with the apples example is, as Brennan points out, its lack of
detail and context; how one interprets it will vary according to the way in which
one ‘ﬁlls in’ the gaps Sen leaves in his vignette. Let us begin with the hypothet-
ical choice with which Sen ends the indented passage quoted above. If A had
chosen ﬁrst, had chosen the smaller apple and had done so out of sympathy, A,
Sen holds, would have ‘lost nothing’. The argumentation underlying this claim is
presumably thus: had A acted from sympathy, he would have received personal
beneﬁt from beholding B’s satisfaction at getting the bigger apple (assuming, of
course, that any displeasure A receives from having the smaller instead of the
larger apple is outweighed by A’s sympathetic pleasure with B’s pleasure at get-
ting the larger apple). By implication, if A were imbued with a heavy enough
dose of sympathy for B, A would have no grounds for complaint if B, in the role
of ﬁrst chooser, chose the bigger apple. Now let us turn to Sen’s actual exam-
ple, namely that in which B chooses ﬁrst and chooses the larger apple. How is
A’s umbrage supposed to indicate that he has a commitment, and to what is he
committed?
Brennan (2007, 118) suggests that A adheres to a norm of politeness and that
B’s failure to observe this norm is the source of A’s irritation. The interpretation
is plausible and conforms to a type of commitment which Sen associates with
norm following (2002, 216; 2007, 348; 2009, 192–3), and to which I will return in
section 4. But Brennan and Sen part ways in their interpretation of the exam-
ple, with Brennan (2007, 119) holding that Sen claims too much for it. Were A to
choose ﬁrst, Brennan argues, he would face a simple trade-off between two val-
ues he wishes to pursue: being polite and getting the largest apple; and if, in the
role of ﬁrst chooser, A were to choose the smaller apple, it would be because the
value of being polite weighed heavier on him than the value of getting the larger
apple. For B, things are otherwise: politeness may be sacriﬁced for receiving the
larger apple. Interpreted thus, the example poses no challenge to the orthodox
notion of rational choice (Brennan, 2007, 118–19): there are two ‘goods’ or ‘ob-
jects of desire’, namely, adhering to the norms of polite behaviour and getting
the larger apple; A and B have different preferences for these two goods, with
A preferring to sacriﬁce the larger apple in favour of polite behaviour, and B
preferring the opposite. The extra conceptual baggage—in particular, the un-
derstanding of commitment as counterpreferential choice—which Sen believes
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contention that A and B face two ‘objects of desire’ in the example is crucial
to grasping the difference between him and Sen, and I ask the reader to keep
it in mind until I return to it in section 4. I ﬁnish this section, though, with
an amendment to something both Brennan and Sen suggest about the apples
example.
Brennan (2007, 120) asks how we would judge A’s response to B’s taking the
larger apple (i) if A had sympathy with B (such that A derives pleasure from B’s
(extra) pleasure from consuming the larger rather than the smaller apple) or (ii)
if A acted from a “commitment (in Sen’s sense) to B’s ﬂourishing”. In both cases
Brennan suggests A’s complaint towards B would be ‘bizarre’. Regarding (i), Sen
apparently agrees, for he writes that A’s anger at B taking the larger apple in-
dicates that A acts from commitment, not from sympathy, the implication being
that A would have no cause for complaint if he had sympathy for B. What lies
behind these claims is presumably that a sympathetic A who cared sufﬁciently
about B’s happiness, would be delighted to see B take the bigger apple (and pos-
sibly maximise his own utility if B takes the larger apple); hence A would have
‘lost nothing’, as Sen writes, but rather gained everything, which is the whole
point of sympathy (understood egoistically). In Brennan’s second case, in which
A is committed to B’s ﬂourishing, A’s offer that B choose ﬁrst may be understood
as an instantiation of A’s commitment which, whilst it might not redound to A’s
personal beneﬁt, is a sacriﬁce A is willing (‘committed’) to make for the cause of
furthering B’s ﬂourishing. Thus follows Brennan’s conclusion that in both cases,
(i) and (ii), a complaint from A would be ‘bizarre’. Nevertheless, I can imagine
variants of (i) and (ii) in which A’s disgruntlement is not inexplicable. In the
sympathetic case, A might derive enough satisfaction from B’s consumption of
the larger apple to outweigh any dissatisfaction A feels from being left with the
smaller apple, and hence it is correct, as Sen writes, that A ‘loses nothing’. But A
might nevertheless feel peeved at B’s rudeness and have preferred that B show
some sign of politeness and gratitude after being asked by A to choose ﬁrst; B’s
replying: ‘no, after you, old chap’ or ‘which one would you prefer?’, might have
come as a welcome response to A who would then nevertheless have gladly in-
sisted (with all the more joy) that B ‘simply must’ choose ﬁrst and (hopefully)
take the larger apple. In the case of an A committed to B’s ﬂourishing, the same
applies: a thus committed A may still take offence at B’s rudeness and chide B
because of it, whilst remaining true to his commitment to B’s ﬂourishing. Con-
sider a similar example, of a parent committed to her child’s ﬂourishing, who
asks her child whether he would like a bed-time story to be read to him. If the
child replies: ‘yes’, as opposed to: ‘yes, please’, the parent might berate the child,
rather as A chides B in the apples example, but the parent might do so not in
spite, but because, of her commitment to the child whom she understands as
somebody in whom the conventions of politeness ought to be instilled. The par-
ent’s commitment might be of the form in which Sen expresses an example of a
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will see to it that he gets a bed-time story come what may’.2 This commitment
does not preclude the parent’s becoming irate at the child’s rudeness. And so
it might be with boy A who could maintain his commitment to B’s ﬂourishing
whilst bemoaning his impoliteness.
3. Commitment and Agent Relativity
Brennan’s further analysis of Sen’s apples reveals a more substantial point to
which I attend in this section. In trying to ascertain whether Sen’s distinction
between sympathy and commitment corresponds to that between preferential
and counterpreferential choice, Brennan (2007, 120) suggests the following con-
trast:
“Suppose C has a commitment to looking after D and makes trans-
fers to D in amount T. Suppose C* has sympathy for D* to an extent
that is behaviourally indistinguishable: the transfer T is the same
in both cases. Now consider the responses of C and C* to an increase
of some amount in D[’s] (and D*[’]s) well-being. One might conclude
that in the sympathy case, C* will be made better off by the increase
in D’s well-being; whereas in the commitment case, C will not be af-
fected one way or the other. Because C has not brought about the
increase in D’s well-being, the increase simply does not bear on C’s
commitments.”
Perhaps unbeknownst to him, Brennan reveals therewith an important facet of
Sen’s notion of commitment, namely, the term’s relationship to another which
Sen discusses—‘agent relativity’. To explore this facet further, let us pursue a
lightly embellished form of Brennan’s parallel examples involving C and D, and
C* and D*. Of particular note is Brennan’s ﬁnal sentence in the passage just
quoted, in which he suggests that, if D were transferred a sum by a third party,
E, this would have no bearing on C’s commitment to care for D; C would ‘not
be affected one way or the other’. I agree with the conclusion that E’s transfer
would have no bearing on C’s commitment in the sense that C would not see
E’s transfer of a sum T as the fulﬁlment of her own commitment, and since
C’s personal well-being might be unaffected by D receiving the transfer, it is
plausible to write that C will not be affected. But there is reason to dispute
the claim that C would ‘not be affected one way or the other’ in the sense of
C’s evaluation of the situation which arises when E makes the transfer to D
compared to her evaluation of the situation which arises when C makes the
same transfer herself.
If C*, who is sympathetic toward D*, learns of E*’s donation of a sum of
money to D*, C*’s well-being (as a result of his sympathy) will increase. Indeed,
2 I am adapting Sen’s example of a commitment which he expresses thus: “no matter what happens
to me, I must help her” (2009, 190).40 Mark S. Peacock
C* might deem D* to have adequate funds as a result of E*’s act of muniﬁcence,
and so C* will be better off if E* (and not C*) makes the donation, for, in both
cases, C* would derive satisfaction from seeing D*’s wealth (and, by implication,
D*’s well-being) increase, but, if E* makes the donation, C* does not have to
‘foot the bill’ for the improvement in D*’s well-being and for the concomitant
improvement in C*’s own well-being (via sympathy with D*). Now consider the
case of commitment whereby third party E makes a similar contribution to the
well-being of D to whose ﬂourishing C has made a commitment. Let us assume
that D is disabled and C’s commitment to D consists in improving D’s mobility. E
beats C to it and provides a wheelchair for D; C learns of this and no longer has
to provide the wheelchair himself; the goal of C’s commitment has been realized.
One might think that C is better off now because he does not have to channel
resources to D which he, C, could use for other causes. And indeed, on Sen’s
understanding of commitment, C might be better off in terms of her own well-
being after E (and not C) provides the wheelchair, because, relieved of the cost
of providing the wheelchair, C could spend the money on a summer holiday for
herself and thereby further her own well-being. But there is something about
E’s provision of the wheelchair to D which, from C’s perspective, constitutes
a morally relevant difference from the case in which C provides the wheelchair
herself, and this difference lies in the very fact that the wheelchair was provided
by E and not by C. If, that is, C is committed to promoting D’s well-being, then
it seems not to be a matter of indifference to C whether the goal of furthering
D’s mobility be effected through C’s own agency and not through the agency of a
third party.
To take stock thus far, the sympathetic C* can be just as happy that D* re-
ceives a gift from a third party as he would be were C* herself to have given that
gift; indeed, if given the choice, C* might actually try to engineer the situation
such that D* would receive the gift from a third party. But the committed C,
whilst possibly being personally better off if a third party provides a wheelchair
to D, would not choose to have the third party provide the wheelchair but would
insist on doing so herself. And, if she has a genuine Senian commitment to D,
C would choose to provide the wheelchair independently of any ‘warm glow’ or
other feeling of personal advantage she feels as a result of doing something good
for D.
But what sort of difference does it make to C whether she or E provide the
wheelchair to D? It cannot be a difference to her personal well-being because
commitments (and whether they are realized) can, by deﬁnition, leave one’s per-
sonal well-being unaffected. The difference it makes to a committed C, whether
she herself or a third party provides the wheelchair to D, is in C’s evaluation
of the two possible states of affairs. From C’s perspective of commitment, a
strictly consequentialist analysis of the situation, in which one looks solely at
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picture, that ‘something’ being who actually provides D with the wheelchair.3
And according to whether C himself or a third party, E, provides D with the
wheelchair, C would evaluate the situation differently. When C provides the
wheelchair herself, the state of affairs which comes to pass has greater moral
signiﬁcance or value for her because she has realised something which she val-
ues, namely, her commitment, something which nobody else can realise for her.
The sympathetic C* might also have reasons for bemoaning the adequacy of
consequentialist analysis of the transfer to D*, but he would do so for differ-
ent a reason: C*’s reason for caring about who transfers the sum to D* is that,
if someone else, not C*, transfers the sum to D*, C* will thereby save himself
some money, safe in the knowledge (and satisfaction) that D*’s well-being has
been enhanced, something from which C*, via sympathy with D*, beneﬁts. C, on
the other hand, cares about who transfers the sum to D because the commitment
to enhancing D’s mobility is her own.
For C, then, we have a case of agent relativity or, in Sen’s taxonomy of agent
relativity, we have a case of ‘viewer relativity’ (Sen 1981, 19–28). That is, the
two states of affairs—(i) D receiving a wheelchair from E, and (ii) D receiving a
wheelchair from C—are of differential moral signiﬁcance from C’s perspective,
even though the strictly consequentialist outcome, viz., D receiving a wheelchair,
is the same in each case. From the viewpoint of a dispassionate observer, how-
ever, who is not directly involved in the doings of C, D or E, it is neither here
nor there who provides D with the wheelchair. Hence, to judge these two states
of affairs, it makes a difference who is making the judgement, the (commited)
doer, C, or a spectator. This difference in moral evaluation between C and a non-
participating observer can arise even if both hold similar moral views according
to which it is good that D receive the wheelchair. Therein lies the agent relative
nature of the evaluation.
May we also conclude conversely that the sympathetic C*’s evaluation of the
two states of affairs in which D* receives a transfer (in the one case from C*,
in the other from a third party, E*) is agent neutral rather than agent relative?
To answer this question, let us ask whether a person who has sympathy with
another should be indifferent to whether the other’s well-being be improved by
the acts of a third party rather than by acts undertaken by herself. If, that is, my
well-being is positively correlated with yours (through sympathetic sentiments
from me to you), are there circumstances under which it becomes important
to me through whose actions—mine or those of a third party—your well-being
increases? Although an afﬁrmative answer is possible and thus agent relativity
conceivable in the case of sympathy, it is, I hold, unlikely to be the case. To see
why, let us look, at the way in which Sen relates commitment and sympathy to
action.
3 Sen (1981, 29) refers to what I have called ‘strictly consequential analysis’ as “especially narrow
formulations” of consequentialism in which “consequences are deﬁned excluding the actions that
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Sen (1981) relates his discussion of agent relativity to neither sympathy nor
commitment, but his description of sympathy and commitment give as a clue to
his position. Sympathy, he writes:
“corresponds to the case in which the concern for others directly af-
fects one’s welfare. If the knowledge of torture of others makes you
sick, it is a case of sympathy. If its [sic] does not make you feel per-
sonally worse off, but you think it is wrong and you are ready to do
something to stop it, it is a case of commitment.” (1982, 91–2)
Of note here is that Sen immediately relates a person’s commitment to her own
action (... ‘you are ready to do something to stop it’ ...), but there is no cor-
responding relation between sympathy and action; sympathy is related to a
‘concern for others’ but not necessarily to doing something oneself to increase
their well-being. More generally, Sen casts sympathy as a more passive sen-
timent than commitment (commitment probably being ill-described as a ‘senti-
ment’ at all): with sympathy, “the awareness of the increase in the welfare of the
other person [...] makes this [sympathetic] person better off” (1982, 92). Mere
‘awareness’ that the other person’s well-being has been increased is sufﬁcient to
increase the well-being of the sympathetic person; there is apparently no rele-
vance as to whether the sympathetic person or someone else brings about this
increase. In the introduction to Choice, Welfare and Measurement of which ‘Ra-
tional fools’ is a chapter, Sen also distinguishes the way in which sympathy and
commitment relate to action: sympathy refers to:
“one person’s welfare being affected by the position of others (e.g.,
feeling depressed at the sight of misery). Commitment, on the other
hand, is concerned with breaking the tight link between individual
welfare (with or without sympathy) and the choice of action (e.g.,
acting to help remove some misery even though one personally does
not suffer from it).” (Sen 1982, 7–8)
In these explications (which Sen quotes in his later works (2002, 214; 2007, 19;
2009, 188–9), commitment, but not sympathy, is clearly aligned with the actions
of the person who has the commitment; the passage quoted connects sympathy
to a ‘feeling’ (see the ﬁrst parenthetic clause of the quotation) but it connects
commitment to ‘acting’ (in the last parenthetic clause). It might, nevertheless,
appear possible to construct cases for which sympathy goes together with agent
relativity. Consider, for instance, a person, P, who acts altruistically towards
another person, S, because P wishes to derive a good feeling (and hence personal
well-being) from doing so. If P were to derive less satisfaction were someone else
instead of P herself to act altruistically towards S, it is obviously important to P
and that she herself (not that other person) performs the act. But this does not
lead us to a situation of agent relativity because P is only evaluating two states
of affairs (one in which she is altruistic to S, another in which a third party
is altruistic to S) from the viewpoint of her own well-being. This is too partialSen’s Apples: Commitment, Agent Relativity and Social Norms 43
an evaluation to be classed as the sort of ‘moral’ evaluation with which agent
relativity in normally associated. To evaluate the two states of affairs morally,
P would have to abstract from her personal well-being whilst evaluating the
alternative situations. But by being sympathetic (rather than committed) to
S, P cannot make this abstraction; the whole motivation of her action is self-
interested. Hence, I conclude that commitment but not sympathy is aligned
with agent relativity.
I now turn to the crux of the disagreement between Brennan and Sen, namely,
their interpretation of norm following behaviour.
4. Binding Oneself
One matter which fuels controversy over the notion of commitment is the ap-
parent facility with which Sen conceives the possibility of committed actions.
The notion that choices be ‘counterpreferential’ or that an agent pursue goals
which are not exclusively her own is perplexing, if not, utterly counterintuitive
to the ears of many. Furthermore, that Sen’s examples of these phenomena are
amenable to less controversial interpretations has led some to let parsimony
(and plausibility) in explanation take precedent and to eschew the notion of
commitment in explaining these examples. Brennan, as we have seen, holds
that one can conceptualise Sen’s apples example without making theoretical
claims of such a controversial or apparently far-fetched nature. Daniel Haus-
man (2007), too, urges an understanding of commitment which does not rely
on the idea of counterpreferential choices. He argues that, if one broadens the
concept of preference to encompass all considerations, including those under the
heading of which Sen places commitments, one can account for Sen’s examples
without introducing the idea of counterpreferential choices. When Hausman
writes of ‘all things considered’ preferences, a ‘consideration’ may be understood
as any factor which can motivate a particular choice and would include narrow
self-interest, sympathy, commitments or anything else which could give one a
reason to choose a course of action. By grouping all such motivations under
the heading ‘preference’, counterpreferential choice would be impossible, for if
something is to motivate a person to act, it must be a preference (in the broad, all
things considered, sense), and if it is not a preference (all things considered), it
cannot motivate action. But whilst banishing counterpreferential choice, Haus-
man sees the need to (re)introduce the sort of distinctions which Sen makes to
get a richer understanding of human behaviour. The difference between the two
lies in the fact that, whereas Sen distinguishes between choices motivated by
preference (narrow self-interest and self-interested sympathy) and those moti-
vated by (non-self-interested) commitment, Hausman makes such distinctions
under the mantle of preferences all things considered. For Hausman, then, and
in contrast to Sen, not only are narrowly self-interested and sympathetically
motivated choices both preference-based (in a capacious understanding of the
term), but so are choices based on commitment; commitment, though a different44 Mark S. Peacock
type of preference to self-interested and sympathetic preferences, is neverthe-
less the manifestation of a preference. It is tempting to hold that the disagree-
ment between Hausman and Sen is ‘merely’ a terminological matter, for both
distinguish types of behaviour similarly, though with different vocabulary. Sen
(2007, 353) conﬁrms this when he registers no hostility to Hausman’s conception
of ‘preference’ in the all things considered sense (though he does doubt whether
Hausman will be successful in getting theorists of rationality to adhere to this
notion of preference). What Sen believes distinguishes him from Hausman is
Sen’s view that commitments stem from an agent’s ‘voluntary’, or self-imposed,
(rather than ‘external’) restrictions on her own behaviour (Sen 2007, 353–4).
His remarks on this difference, though, are both lapidary and somewhat cryptic.
I hold that the differences between Sen and his critics can indeed be exempli-
ﬁed if one looks at Sen’s remarks on self-imposed restrictions which make an
agent adhere to social norms. Because this difference is crucial to the exchange
between Brennan and Sen, I return to the work of the former to elucidate the
disagreement.
Consider two alternative presentations of norm following behaviour which
we may call:
(a) the preference abiding view,
(b) the counterpreferential view.
The preference abiding view is manifest in Brennan’s interpretation of Sen’s ap-
ples example and is encapsulated in the phrase with which Brennan (2007, 122)
concludes his argument against the view that committed behaviour be coun-
terpreferential: “it is perfectly proper to treat agents as having preferences for
norm-fulﬁlment”. As we saw in section 2, Sen’s boy A, according to Brennan, has
a preference for adhering to the norm of politeness and prefers to sacriﬁce the
bigger apple in favour of fulﬁlling the norm of politeness. There is, according
to this view, nothing ‘counterpreferential’ going on here; both getting the big-
ger apple and adhering to the norm of politeness are ‘objects of desire’, to recall
Brennan’s phrase, between which A chooses the one he prefers more which, as it
happens, is politeness. Sen, on the other hand, adheres to (b), the counterprefer-
ential view of norm following, according to which, if I commit myself to a norm,
e.g. being polite, not stealing, not defecting in prisoners’ dilemma situations,
then breaking the norm (being impolite, stealing opportunistically, defecting in
a prisoners’ dilemma if I think I can gain personally from perpetrating such
breaches) is no longer an object of choice for me; I have put it off limits to my
rational calculation by committing myself to adhering to the norm. Consider
boy A again. For Brennan, one may say, if boy A were to have ﬁrst choice of
apple, he would be ‘free to choose’ between the larger apple and being polite,
these being the objects of desire between which he is to choose. For Sen, by con-
trast, A, having committed himself to adhering to the norms of politeness, is no
longer free to choose in the manner just depicted; A might still consider taking
the larger apple and adhering to norms of politeness as objects of desire in Bren-
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has no choice but to adhere to the norms of politeness; taking the larger apple
would therefore not be an object of choice to A, however much he desires it (and
desires it more than adhering to the norm of politeness). And if A had had ﬁrst
choice of apple and have permitted himself to take the larger apple, this would
show that he did not really have a commitment to the norms of politeness at all,
at least not in Sen’s sense. What is more (and to reiterate what I wrote at the
end of the previous paragraph), Sen conceives of A (or of anyone who can make
a commitment to norm following) as somebody who can impose such constraints
on his own contingent choices voluntarily and who can abide by his self-imposed
constraints without the need of external sanction or ﬁllip. External sanction or
ﬁllip might help A abide by his commitments, but Sen nowhere states that they
are necessary to make A abide by his own commitments. By sticking to one’s
commitment to fulﬁl a norm, Sen claims that one’s commitment can be strong
enough to make one refrain from opportunistically acting to one’s personal ben-
eﬁt by breaking the norm. A commitment is therefore a device with which an
agent can ensure that her choices are time consistent; an agent, that is, who,
at time t1, commits herself to adhering to a particular norm will adhere to this
norm in acting at time t2 even if, at t2, she does not expect adhering to the
norm to redound to her personal advantage; breaking the norm would be prefer-
able to her but nevertheless she adheres to the norm. This is what Sen calls
the counterpreferential nature commitments. Sen, to my knowledge, has never
expressed his notion of commitment in quite this way.
5. Conclusion: Sen and Behavioural Economics
To conclude, I elucidate the difference between Sen and many economists by
contrasting his notion of commitment with the theories of human beings which
have issued from behavioural and experimental economists. To see this, let us
create a variation on Brennan’s norm-following interpretation of A’s anger that
B takes the larger apple by bringing to the fore that it is not only B’s failure
to be polite which disturbs A but the fact that A expects B to reciprocate the
politeness or generosity that A would manifest toward B, were A to choose ﬁrst.
A’s anger is to be explained not only by B’s failure to follow the content of the
norm (‘be polite!’), but also by the lack of reciprocation from B. The expectation
of reciprocity is attached to many, perhaps all, norms unless there is good reason
for relieving one party to a situation of the obligation to follow the norm. A sees
no such reason in the case of B. A sees B and himself as part of a ‘community’
in which both are bound by restrictions imposed by norms of politeness; B sees
the relationship between himself and A differently because, for B, apparently
no such norm presents itself as binding on him (and presumably, unless he has
an outrageous cheek, B would not hold it against A if, in the position of ﬁrst-
chooser, A would take the bigger apple). A’s claim (made on his behalf by Sen)
that, had he chosen ﬁrst, he would have taken the smaller apple, may be seen
as an offer of ‘cooperation’ towards B (analogous to cooperation in a prisoners’46 Mark S. Peacock
dilemma or in making contributions to the provision of public goods). Exper-
imental economists have produced results which suggest that cooperators like
A expect reciprocal cooperation from those with whom they interact, and that,
if reciprocal cooperation is not forthcoming, they are prepared to ‘punish’ non-
reciprocators at a cost to themselves (see, e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Gintis
et al. 2003). Although Sen does not conceive the interaction between A and B as
‘iterated’, one may nevertheless conceive A’s complaint towards B to stem from a
willingness to ‘punish’ B for his transgression, and thus A’s complaint is a type
of ‘altruistic punishment’ (Fehr and Gächter 2002). Experimental economists
rightly see the theoretical innovations they have made in light of experimental
results as a challenge to mainstream economists’ notion of rationality. In par-
ticular, they challenge one assumption which Sen challenges in ‘Rational fools’,
viz., that human beings are motivated solely to pursue their own self-interest
(narrowly conceived) (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, 788; Sen 1982, 105). But ex-
perimental and behavioural economists conceive cooperation and altruistic pun-
ishment to be based on preferences for fairness or for distributions which answer
to the name of ‘equality’ (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). This is at odds with Sen’s
conception of human beings who can act not only on preferences which are not
‘self-interested’ but can bind themselves to act on principles for which they have
no preference. If I have a preference for fairness or equality, I look at the attain-
ment of fair or egalitarian outcomes as objects of choice which I must compare to
other objects of choice between which I can choose. But if one has a commitment
to social justice (one of Sen’s examples), then attaining socially just outcomes
are no longer objects of choice but obligations. Commitments therefore serve as
‘side constraints’ on one’s own behaviour; if the things to which we commit our-
selves remain objects of choice, then they are no more than objects which we may
choose or decline to choose according to our whims; to capture such a situation, a
single (but encompassing) notion of preference would sufﬁce, and Brennan and
Hausman would be correct to reject the notion of counterpreferential choice.
Sen’s Menschenbild, though, deviates further from that of mainstream the-
orists of rationality than that of behavioural economists or of theorists like
Brennan and Hausman (cf. Sen 2002, 26–33). I have not attempted here to
defend Sen’s Menschenbild or to investigate examples in which it is valid. I
hope, though, to have elucidated the peculiarity of his position in a new and
perspicuous way.
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